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Introduction
The Mining and Chemical Combine (MCC), located approximately 60 km north of
the city of Krasnoyarsk, is one of two major sites in the Russian Federation where
liquid radioactive wastes (LRW) are disposed of by deep well injection. Disposal
of LRW at the MCC through the use of deep well injection started in 1967. The
Severny (“Northern”) site, approximately 15 km north of the MCC, was launched
after the completion of special geological surveys and explorations performed by
institutions of the Ministry of Geology and Russian Academy of Sciences. The site
was designed by Minatom institutions. As of 1995, 5 million cubic meters (m3)
of LRW had been injected into two deep aquifers at the site. The waste includes
both radioactive fission products and nonradioactive chemicals used in reprocess-
ing of spent fuel. The total activity, decay corrected to 1995, is approximately
250 million Curies (Ci). Detailed information about radioactive waste disposal at
the Severny site is presented in Volume I of this report (Compton et al., 2000),
which includes an evaluation of the safety of the site under normal post-operational
conditions. For further information on the background data contained in Chapter 2
of that report, see Appendix I. The subject of the current report is the likelihood
and consequences of hypothetical accidents and extreme natural events after site
decommissioning, including a brief overview of the factors involved in the devel-
opment of decommissioning plans at the site.
1
2
Discussion of Hypothetical Accidents and
Problems
The primary discussion of hypothetical accidents and problems scenarios was pre-
pared by the All-Russian Design and Research Institute of Production Engineering
(VNIPIPT). In their Phase I report (VNIPIPT, 1998), potential problems were di-
vided into two categories: operational and post-operational. Operational problems
include
• damage to surface equipment and wells,
• development of potentially dangerous conditions in a reservoir horizon due to
disposal operations,
• mistakes during the siting, design, and operation of the repository, and
• natural disasters and natural accidents during operation.
Post-operational problems include
• abnormal migration of wastes with the flow of underground waters or vertical
redistribution of wastes,
• degradation of the condition of decommissioned wells,
• intrusion into the waste horizons by future generations, and
• natural changes of the geologic environment.
This work focuses on the second class of problem scenarios, that is, hypo-
thetical conditions that could arise after decommissioning of the site. The post-
operational problems listed above were reviewed and two worst-case scenarios
were selected for analysis. The first scenario selected was that of an inadvertent
intrusion into the waste disposal aquifers by future generations and the use of the
contaminated groundwater as a sole source of drinking water. The second scenario
selected was the failure of the confining ability of the fault zone bounding the site
as a result of future tectonic activity and the consequent migration of wastes toward
2
3the Yenisei River. In addition, a sensitivity analysis was carried out to examine the
significance of uncertainty in hydrological parameters in Horizon I.
The scenario in which the confining ability of the clay layer overlying Hori-
zon I is degraded (e.g., by an unsealed well drilled into Horizon I or the degra-
dation of well sealing in a Horizon I well) was not fully evaluated in this study.
VNIPIPT performed an evaluation (VNIPIPT, 1998) based on the results of studies
at Moscow University and the Institute of Physical Chemistry which concluded that
degradation of the conserved wells will not occur after site decommissioning. The
VNIPIPT study also evaluated the flow that could occur under injection conditions
and concluded that approximately 8 m3 could flow to an overlying horizon over
approximately 30 years (approximately 0.8 liters per day [L/d], under the assump-
tions of the analysis). However, an evaluation of resulting contamination levels in
the upper horizon and the doses that could be received was not conducted.
However, the scenario of an unsealed borehole (resulting either from mistakes
during decommissioning or from future drilling leaving an unsealed puncture in the
confining layer) was not evaluated. Additional data on the hydrologic parameters
of the aquifers overlying the disposal ground (transmissivity, water head, etc.) and
on the type of potential interconnections (e.g., fully penetrating all aquifers, such
as an unsealed shaft through all horizons, versus a partially penetrating intercon-
nection linking Horizon I with Horizon III through the interior of a well casing) are
necessary for a full examination of this problem.
3
Waste Transport in Horizon I: Sensitivity
Analyses
The transmissivity and porosity of aquifers are typically among the most important
parameters in modeling the migration of contaminated groundwater. Unfortunately,
however, these parameters are often characterized by a relatively high level of un-
certainty. This is true at the Severny injection site, where no data on spatial vari-
ability of porosity and only limited information on the pumping tests used to derive
transmissivity values were available. The sensitivity of the migration patterns of
the intermediate-level waste (ILW) and high-level waste (HLW) in Horizon I to
changes in these parameters was therefore analyzed by the Institute of Geology of
Ore Deposits, Peterography, Mineralogy and Geochemistry, or IGEM (1999a) us-
ing the code developed in Phase I (IGEM, 1998b) for modeling migration of dense
wastes. Their results are summarized here.
The first sensitivity analysis considered the sensitivity of the waste movement to
changes in porosity. The nominal value of porosity for the entire aquifer was 0.07
(VNIPIPT, 1998). As a decrease in porosity leads to an increase in groundwater
velocity, it was decided to examine the effect of halving the porosity from 0.07 to
0.035. The results for both cases are shown in Figure 3.1. A simple application of
Darcy’s law would imply that the distance traveled by the plume should increase
by a factor of two. However, only a marginal increase in the spread of the plume
is shown in Figure 3.1. The explanation for this seeming anomaly is that density
effects dominate regional head-driven flow patterns in the IGEM model of waste
transport, causing the dense saline wastes to settle in the syncline region north of
the disposal area.
The second analysis examined the sensitivity of model results to changes in
transmissivity. Transmissivity values determined from pumping tests at 10 differ-
ent wells were given in VNIPIPT (1998). The sensitivity analysis was conducted
by performing a new calibration of the model (see IGEM, 1998b) with increased
values of transmissivity. Each reported value of transmissivity was increased by a
factor of two, and the calibration procedure was reapplied to obtain a new distri-
bution for the transmissivity and leakage parameter. The results of modeling the
4
5Figure 3.1. Position of waste plume at 1,000 years: (a) porosity n = 0.07; (b) poros-
ity n = 0.035.
transport of the dense Horizon I wastes using the altered transmissivity distribution
are shown in Figure 3.2. Again, it can be seen that the movement of the waste plume
is slower than might be expected. The explanation is the same: density-driven flow
dominates regional groundwater flow for the dense wastes, causing them to settle
in the depression north of the site. In addition, the recalibration caused changes
6Figure 3.2. Position of waste plume at 1,000 years: (a) nominal transmissivity;
(b) 2× nominal transmissivity.
in the leakage time of wastes from Horizon I to Horizon II. The effects of these
changes are seen in Figure 3.3. It can be seen that the distribution of the leak-
age time drops rather significantly as a result of model recalibration with increased
transmissivities. However, in all areas of the aquifer, leakage through the confining
layer requires over 1,000 years.
7Figure 3.3. Leakage time through confining layer: (a) nominal transmissivity; (b)
2× nominal transmissivity.
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Inadvertent Intrusion into Disposal
Horizons
Analysis of the inadvertent intrusion scenario was conducted in two parts. The
first part is a quantitative analysis of the consequences of a failure of institutional
controls, leading to the use of drinking water from a well located in a disposal hori-
zon. The second part is a qualitative analysis of the likelihood of such an intrusion.
Since the risk posed by the contaminants in the subsurface is a function of the prob-
ability of exposure as well as the consequences of exposure, a formal analysis of
the likelihood of exposure gives a more complete picture of the risks.
For the Phase II analysis presented in this volume, the numerical model used
for the base case (discussed in Volume I of this report, see Compton et al., 2000)
was updated to include the effects of radioactive decay and sorption in a more
comprehensive manner. Another refinement to the original model was the more
limited area of potential discharge of Horizon I, based partially on the results of
the modeling performed by IGEM in Phase I studies (IGEM, 1998a) and partially
on IIASA interpretation of the input data. As a result of these changes, the model
now simulates flow passing underneath the Bolshoi Tel River and continuing to
flow north toward the Kan River. In addition, the modeled area of Horizon I was
expanded to include the upthrown block and the Yenisei River. The third refinement
to the base case model was the inclusion of dispersion and molecular diffusion.
The inadvertent intrusion scenario assumes that a well is drilled into the dis-
posal horizons and the water is used for drinking water. The exposure point is thus
the contaminated water in the aquifer itself, and the exposure pathway is use of
contaminated water as drinking water. Evaluation of doses due to agricultural path-
ways was not carried out because of a lack of agricultural data for the region. These
doses could be significant.
Since the location of future wells cannot be determined, the analysis was per-
formed in two conceptual steps. The first step was to model the transport of con-
taminants in the subsurface. The transport analysis is thus identical to the transport
analysis conducted for the base case. However, unlike in the base case, a dose factor
was developed and applied directly to the subsurface contaminant concentrations.
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9This allows the creation of a plot of potential total drinking water doses at all points
in the aquifer at a given time. Dose factors are based on the 50-year committed ef-
fective dose equivalent due to ingestion of contaminated groundwater for a period
of one year. Development of the subsurface dose plots permits a determination of
the areas that may yield unacceptable doses if wells are placed there in the future.
4.1 Consequence Analysis
Modeling was carried out using MODFLOW-96 (McDonald and Harbaugh, 1988;
Harbaugh and McDonald, 1996) and MOC3D (Konikow et al., 1996). The follow-
ing model descriptions are based on the descriptions included with the software.
MODFLOW is a three-dimensional, finite-difference groundwater flow model
designed to simulate aquifer systems that meet the following assumptions:
• saturated-flow conditions exist,
• Darcy’s law applies,
• the density of groundwater is constant, and
• the principal directions of horizontal hydraulic conductivity or transmissivity
do not vary within the system.
MODFLOW can simulate steady and nonsteady flow in an irregularly shaped
flow system. The aquifer layers can be confined, unconfined, or a combination of
confined and unconfined. External stresses such as wells, areal recharge, evapo-
transpiration, drains, and flow through riverbeds can be simulated. Hydraulic con-
ductivities or transmissivities for any layer may differ spatially and be anisotropic,
and the storage coefficient may also be spatially varied. A variety of head and flux
boundary conditions can be specified. The groundwater flow equation is solved us-
ing the finite-difference approximation. The flow region is considered to be subdi-
vided into blocks in which the medium properties are assumed to be uniform. This
results in a rectangular grid, which may be variably spaced. The vertical direction
zones of varying thickness are transformed into a set of parallel “layers.” Several
solvers are provided for solving the associated matrix problem. Mass balances are
computed for each time step and as a cumulative volume from each source and type
of discharge.
Contaminant transport was modeled using MOC3D. MOC3D simulates three-
dimensional solute transport of a single reactive species in flowing groundwater.
Processes modeled by MOC3D include advective transport, hydrodynamic dis-
persion (including both mechanical dispersion and diffusion), mixing (or dilution)
from fluid sources, and mathematically simple reactions (including linear sorption,
which is represented by a retardation factor, and first-order decay). The transport
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model is integrated with MODFLOW and uses the method of characteristics to
solve the transport equation on the basis of the hydraulic gradients computed with
MODFLOW for a given time step. Particle tracking is used to represent advective
transport, and explicit finite-difference methods are used to calculate the effects of
other processes.
4.1.1 Input data
Hydrological data
The aquifers are considered to be confined systems. Horizons I and II were mod-
eled independently as single layers. The system properties necessary to model
groundwater flow in the aquifers include the following:
• Flow conditions in the aquifer (including boundary conditions such as constant
head cells, no-flow cells, etc.).
• Starting heads used to initialize the model.
• Either transmissivity or hydraulic conductivity and thickness of the aquifer. The
saturated thickness can also be specified for a confined aquifer by providing the
top and bottom surfaces of the aquifer.
For Horizon I, the modeled area was expanded from the Phase I analysis to
include the region between the fault zone and the Yenisei River. As data for this
region are very limited, a hydraulic transmissivity of 2.5 square meters per day
(m2/d) was used for the entire upthrown block (VNIPIPT, 1998). As there were no
transmissivity or water head data for Horizon II in this region, the data from the
modeled area used in the Phase I analysis was also used in this study. The model
grids were evenly spaced, with a 50-m grid spacing along both axes. A mixture
of constant head and no-flow cells was used to establish boundary conditions for
the model. These boundary conditions are shown in Figure 4.1. In general, a
constant head boundary was used for the northern and southern boundaries of the
systems. No-flow boundaries were used to the east to simulate the wedging out of
the horizons.
For modeling in Horizon I, the area under the Yenisei River is modeled as a
constant head boundary. In addition, it was found that a proper match between the
observed heads and the modeled heads could not be generated unless a section of
the Bolshoi Tel was modeled as a constant head zone. The minimum number of
constant head cells under the Bolshoi Tel required to match the modeled heads to
the observed heads was used. It was found that modeling the section of the Bolshoi
Tel to the northeast of the disposal site and a small section to the east of the site
as constant head zones reproduced the observed head distribution. In Horizon II, it
11
Figure 4.1. Model boundary conditions and initial plume distribution: (a) Hori-
zon I, high- and intermediate-level waste; (b) Horizon II, low-level waste.
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was found that the entire area of the Bolshoi Tel had to be modeled as a constant
head zone to reproduce the observed heads.
There are two possibilities for modeling the effect of the fault zone. One ap-
proach is to assume that the fault zone acts as a perfect barrier to flow and thus use
a no-flow boundary. This approach was used in the Phase I analysis, resulting in
head errors in the northwestern section of the allotment area. The second approach
is to use a very low value of transmissivity for the region of the fault zone, thereby
imparting a resistance to flow to match the observed heads. The latter approach was
used in this Phase II analysis for modeling in both Horizon I and Horizon II. For
Horizon I, the fault zone was modeled as a low-transmissivity area in the region of
the disposal site, with a higher value of transmissivity used in the northern section
of the fault zone. A more detailed analysis of the approach used to model the effect
of the fault zone is given in Chapter 5. For Horizon II, however, there were no data
on properties west of the fault zone. In addition, the isopotential lines based on ob-
served heads are perpendicular to the fault zone along its entire length in Horizon II,
indicating no-flow conditions. Therefore, a uniformly low value of transmissivity
was used to ensure that no flow occurred across the fault zone. Plots of the water
heads, hydraulic transmissivity, and basement and roof elevations were provided by
VNIPIPT (1998) for each horizon. These paper charts were digitized using Surfer
(Golden Software, 1996) and transformed into MODFLOW input files. Some data
on the hydraulic properties of these horizons were also provided in tabular format.
For further information on the data presented in Chapter 2 of Volume I of this report
(Compton et al., 2000), see Appendix I.
Waste transport and dose estimation
Modeling the contaminant transport in the aquifers requires additional data. Mod-
eling was conducted for the period following site decommissioning and restoration
of normal subsurface flow. MOC3D requires specification of the following data:
• initial contaminant concentration
• aquifer thickness
• aquifer dispersivity
• aquifer porosity
• diffusion coefficient
• first-order (i.e., radioactive) decay coefficient
• retardation factor
Dose analysis was carried out on a unit dose factor basis, with a dose con-
version factor (DCF) applied to the concentrations determined by MOC3D. The
DCFs used for each radionuclide modeled are given in Table 4.1, based on 2.2 L/d
13
Table 4.1. Radionuclide dose conversion factors.
Dose
Dose factor, conversion factor,
Radionuclide Sv/Bq Sv/yr per Bq/L
241Am 2E-07 1.6E-04
135Cs 2E-09 1.6E-06
137Cs 1.3E-08 1.0E-05
237Np 1.1E-07 9.1E-05
239Pu 2.5E-07 2.0E-04
90Sr 2.8E-08 2.2E-05
99Tc 6.4E-10 5.0E-07
of groundwater consumption. Dose factors are from ICRP Publication 72 (ICRP,
1996).
Contaminants with short half-lives were not modeled in this analysis. Because
of the slow rate of groundwater movement in the aquifers, it is expected that insti-
tutional controls will be maintained long enough to ensure that these contaminants
will decay to permissible levels before reaching the site boundary. For example,
tritium, with a 12.3-year half-life, will decay rapidly, dropping approximately three
orders of magnitude in 125 years and six orders of magnitude in approximately
250 years.
The consequence analysis of an inadvertent intrusion is highly dependent on
the initial contaminant distribution. This is because the maximum dose at any given
time in the future corresponds to the maximum concentration at that time, and the
maximum concentration at any given time in the future is strongly dependent on
the initial contaminant distribution. There are several approaches to determining
the initial contaminant distribution. These include explicit modeling of plume for-
mation using a model capable of simulating both hydrodynamic flow and changes
in the subsurface chemistry over time; using in situ measurements of the existing
contaminant distribution; or making simple assumptions about plume formation.
In the first method, injection operations are modeled explicitly, using data on
injection rates and the kinetic properties of geochemical reactions during injec-
tion. However, no historical data were available to IIASA on the variation in waste
injection rates or the changing composition of the waste stream over time. More-
over, few of the available models can simulate changing geochemical conditions
and contaminant transport simultaneously. As the analysis in this report is only a
scoping analysis, it was decided to use a simpler, less data-intensive approach.
In the second method, measurements of the plume are taken in situ and the dis-
tributions of the plumes are determined using measurements of individual isotopes.
Data on the extent of the plume in each horizon were provided by VNIPIPT (1998)
and are presented in Volume I of this report (Compton et al., 2000). However, the
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boundaries of the plume shown are based on measurements of nonsorbing tritium
and nitrate. Since these constituents are not sorbed, they generally will migrate
farther during the injection period than contaminants that are sorbed. Use of this
plume distribution for sorbed contaminants will thus result in an overestimate of the
volume of water contaminated with sorbing contaminants. However, the data avail-
able to IIASA only give isotope-specific information on tritium and nitrate levels;
other measurements are for gross radioactivity, with no indication of the isotopic
distribution in the wells.
This leaves the third alternative, which is to make an assumption regarding the
initial plume distribution based on simple models of plume formation. There are
two possibilities for a simplified approach. The first is to modify the results of the
tritium and nitrate monitoring to account for sorption by reducing the size of the
plume for the sorbed isotopes. The second is to set up a plume with a simplified
geometry using simple models of plume formation. The latter approach was taken
and is discussed in more detail below.
A simple one-dimensional advection dispersion equation for a step input of
radioactivity in a constant one-dimensional flow field can be used to model waste
injection. This is expressed as
δC
δt
=
Dδ2C
Rδx2
−
uδC
Rδx
+
Cinj × u
R
δ(x)[h(t) − h(t− T )] , (4.1)
where C is the aqueous phase concentration; D is the dispersion coefficient; R is
the retardation factor; u is the groundwater velocity in the direction of flow; Cinj
is the activity concentration in the injected fluid; δ(x) is the delta function; T is the
time period of injection; and h(t) is the step function.
Application of this equation requires the assumption that the groundwater ve-
locity, u, is equal to the velocity of the fluid exiting the well screen. As the re-
gional flow field is extremely weak in comparison with the flow field established
during injection, this assumption is taken to be valid for the immediate vicinity of
the disposal area during the period of waste injection. The plume is formed un-
der the conditions of waste injection and then migrates after site decommissioning
under conditions of normal regional groundwater flow. Dispersion is assumed to
be negligible. Solution of Equation (4.1) under the stated assumptions shows that
the aqueous phase concentration in the aquifer will equal the concentration in the
injected waste:
C(x, t) = Cinj
[
h(x−
u× t
R
)− h[x−
u
R
(t+ T )]
]
. (4.2)
15
Table 4.2. Estimated plume areas for nonsorbing contaminants.
Horizon I Horizon II
HLW ILW LLW
Total volume, m3 68,000 2,136,000 2,780,000
Effective thickness, m 30 30 30
Porosity 0.07 0.07 0.1
Effective radius, m 102 570 543
Modeled surface area, ha 3.2 102 93
Note: HLW = high-level waste; ILW = intermediate-level waste; LLW = low-level waste.
It can be shown from the solution above that the aqueous volume of a sorbed
contaminant is proportional to the inverse of the retardation factor, or
Vaq =
Vinj
R
, (4.3)
where Vaq is the volume of contaminated groundwater, Vinj is the volume of the
injected waste, and R is the retardation factor during injection. The partitioning
of the waste between the solid and aqueous phases during injection will therefore
result in a reduction in the volume of contaminated water relative to the volume of
injected waste while maintaining the injected aqueous phase concentration.
If we assume a constant thickness in the contaminated zone, the area of the
plume (and therefore the number of model cells in the layer to be treated as initially
contaminated) is directly proportional to the volume of the contamination plume.
The properties of the assumed plume for a nonsorbing contaminant are given in
Table 4.2.
For modeling purposes, the initial concentration was set uniformly at 100 units.
In MOC3D, the concentration is given in units of mass per cubic liter (M/L3). The
unit of length in the model is meters; however, the mass units are undefined. There-
fore, the units of concentration can be taken as activity per volume, or becquerels
per cubic meter (Bq/m3). Because the plumes were modeled with a uniform con-
centration of 100 units, the DCFs applied to the model output are given for each
waste stream modeled. These are derived using the following formula:
DCFingestion =
DCF (Sv/yr
Bq/L )× Cinj(Bq/L)
100(unitless concentration)
. (4.4)
Multiplying this DCF by the model results gives the dose resulting from inges-
tion of groundwater at each point in the modeled domain. DCFs for waste streams
are given in Table 4.3 (for high-level waste [HLW] and intermediate-level waste
[ILW]) and Table 4.4 (for low-level waste [LLW]).
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Table 4.3. Horizon I transport model isotope-specific parameters.
Injected Decay Modeled Dose conversion factor, Estimated
Radio- concentration, constant, retardation mSv/yr per 100 units of plume
nuclide Bq/L 1/d factor (R) initial concentration radius, m
High-level waste
241Am 7.03E+05 4.4E-06 5 1.1E+03 45
135Cs 1.11E+04 8.3E-10 13 1.8E-01 28
137Cs 2.96E+09 6.3E-05 13 3.1E+05 28
237Np 5.55E+03 8.9E-10 9 5.0E+00 34
239Pu 8.14E+04 7.9E-08 13 1.6E+02 28
90Sr 4.44E+10 6.5E-05 6 9.9E+06 41
99Tc 2.96E+05 8.9E-09 1 1.5E+00 102
Intermediate-level waste
135Cs 9.19E+03 8.3E-10 30 1.5E-01 68
137Cs 2.27E+09 6.3E-05 30 2.4E+05 68
239Pu 1.35E+05 7.9E-08 200 2.7E+02 26
90Sr 7.55E+07 6.5E-05 26 1.7E+04 73
99Tc 2.96E+05 8.9E-09 1 1.5E+00 373
The HLW and ILW plumes, both located in Horizon I, were modeled sepa-
rately. The initial plume distributions used for modeling in Horizon I are shown in
Figure 4.1a. As injection well N-2 is the primary injection well for HLWs, the ini-
tial HLW plume was centered on that well. Likewise, the ILW plume was centered
on wells N-4, N-5, and N-6. The plots shown are for a nonsorbed contaminant. For
sorbing contaminants, the area of the plume was reduced by a factor of 1/R.
A summary of the isotope-specific input data for modeling waste transport in
Horizon I is given in Table 4.3.
A value of 1 m was used for the dispersion coefficient in accordance with the
estimate of the disperson coefficient from VNIPIPT (1998). A value of 2 × 10−11
square meters per second (m2/sec) was used for the molecular diffusion coefficient
for all contaminants. There were no data on the distribution of porosity in the
aquifer. A single value of 0.07 was used for Horizon I, based on Rybalchenko et
al. (1994). For Horizon I, modeling was carried out for a total of 10,000 years.
Outputs were generated for 300, 500, 1,000, 3,000, 5,000, and 10,000 years. The
modeled thickness of Horizon I was derived by subtracting the bottom elevation
from the top elevation.
Similar assumptions were used for modeling LLW migration in Horizon II. As
there were no data on the hydrological properties of Horizon II on the western side
of the fault zone, the hydrologic model used in the Phase I analysis was used for the
Phase II analysis as well. The initial plume distribution for the LLW in Horizon II
is given in Figure 4.1b. It should be noted that, as all the modeled constituents of
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Table 4.4. Horizon II transport model isotope-specific parameters.
Injected Decay Modeled Dose conversion factor, Estimated
Radio- concentration, constant, retardation mSv/yr per 100 units of plume
nuclide Bq/L 1/d factor (R) initial concentration radius, m
137Cs 1.48E+04 6.33E-05 350 1.5E+00 29
239Pu 3.70E+01 7.91E-08 500 7.4E-02 24
90Sr 4.81E+04 6.52E-05 200 1.1E+01 38
LLW in Horizon II are relatively strongly sorbed, the initial plumes used for mod-
eling reflect the reduction in aqueous phase plume area due to sorption. The area
occupied by a nonsorbing constituent would be considerably greater, similar to the
area shown for the ILW plume in Horizon I. Table 4.4 gives the model parameters
for LLW migration modeling.
Because of the lower amounts of activity and the predominance of short-lived
137Cs and 90Sr in the LLW injected into Horizon II, modeling was only carried out
for 1,000 years. Outputs were developed for 300, 500, and 1,000 years. There were
no data on the distribution of porosity in the aquifer. A single value of 0.1 was
used for Horizon II, based on Rybalchenko et al. (1994). As in Horizon I, a value
of 1 m was used for the dispersion coefficient and a value of 2 × 10−11 m2/sec
was used for the molecular diffusion coefficient for all contaminants. The modeled
thickness of Horizon II was derived by subtracting the bottom elevation from the
top elevation.
Geochemical changes in the subsurface
One important factor that was not considered in transport modeling was the possi-
bility of a reduction in the aqueous phase concentration as a result of changes in the
geochemical properties in the subsurface. This is of particular importance for the
HLWs injected into Horizon I. HLWs are highly acidic saline solutions. The dis-
tribution coefficients of the radionuclides are highly dependent upon pH and ionic
strength, as shown in Table 4.5 (adapted from Rybalchenko et al., 1994, table 3.8).
During injection, the HLWs are likely to be characterized by distribution co-
efficients (KD) similar to those in the pH 2–3 column of Table 4.5. These low
distribution coefficients are necessary during initial injection to prevent excessive
buildup of radionuclides near the screen zone of the injection well, as discussed by
Rybalchenko et al. (1994). However, after the injection operations, the pH will rise
as acids are neutralized, and the ionic strength will fall as the salts migrate away
from the radionuclides. The increase in KD will have two effects in this case. First,
the contaminant plumes will move more slowly as the retardation factor increases.
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Table 4.5. Dependence of distribution coefficient (KD) on pH and ionic strength.
pH 2–3a 4–5 ∼8b 8c
Ionic strength, µ 1.0 1.0 0.3–0.5 0.1
Radionuclide
90Sr 1.5–5.5 10–35 7–10 20–30
106Ru 0.5–1.5 7.5–15 2–2.5 4.6–7.5
135,137Cs 1.5–3.0 10–20 8–15 20–50
144Ce 1.0–1.5 40–100 5–10 9.5–19
237Np (No data)
239Pu 1.2–1.6 50–120 5–12 15–35
241Am (No data)
99Tc (No data)
aTaken as representative of high-level waste.
bTaken as representative of intermediate-level waste.
cTaken as representative of normal subsurface conditions.
Second, the aqueous phase concentration will drop as a larger fraction of the ra-
dionuclide is transferred to the solid phase while remaining in the same subsurface
volume.
The actual distribution of individual isotopes in the subsurface will be gov-
erned by a variety of factors. Changes in the distribution coefficient are just one
such factor. Because of data and model limitations, detailed analysis of the dy-
namics of plume formation was not performed. However, any long-term analysis
of the repository safety that is sensitive to the maximum contaminant concentra-
tion in the subsurface, in either the aqueous or solid phase, will be substantially
affected by the initial distribution of radionuclides within the contaminated plume.
Better measurements of the isotopic distributions in the plumes would improve this
situation. However, the ability to indirectly monitor individual constituents is lim-
ited. Transient models to analyze initial plume formation, which incorporate both
hydrodynamic and geochemical processes, would be useful in performing a more
precise determination of the initial distribution.
4.1.2 Results
The results of hydraulic modeling of Horizon I are shown in Figure 4.2, and the
results of transport modeling are shown in Figure 4.3. The doses from the individ-
ual radionuclides in both the HLW and the ILW are summed at each point in the
aquifer to give the total dose resulting from all radionuclides at each point in the
aquifer. Dose contours are given for 1 millisievert (mSv) in Figure 4.3a and for
1 mSv, 10 mSv, 100 mSv, and 1 sievert (Sv) in Figures 4.3b and 4.3c.
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Figure 4.2. Modeled and observed heads in Horizon I.
The resulting picture differs significantly from the picture of waste migration
presented in the Phase I analysis. The most obvious difference is the effect of sorp-
tion. Apart from 99Tc, which was modeled with a retardation factor of 1 (indicating
no sorption), all of the radionuclides migrate extremely slowly. This is true even
though the retardation factors used were conservative lower bounds. In reality, the
retardation factors are likely to be higher, and thus the plumes are likely to migrate
even more slowly. It appears that, because of the very low velocity of groundwater
movement, the primary mechanism for dispersal of the wastes will be mechanical
dispersion and molecular diffusion. The plumes are almost stationary for relatively
strongly sorbed contaminants such as 239Pu, 241Am, 135Cs, 137Cs, and 90Sr; 237Np
is somewhat more mobile, but still migrates very slowly. The results of the analysis
indicate that these wastes will remain within the current site boundary for at least
10,000 years (the time limit used in this analysis), and in all likelihood much longer.
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Figure 4.3. Horizon I intrusion doses: (a) from 500 to 10,000 years.
However, due to the extremely slow rate of diffusion, mechanical dispersion, and
radioactive decay, high concentrations of long-lived isotopes will also remain.
The maximum doses are shown in Table 4.6. The information in this table
should be used with caution. Since the dynamics of plume formation were not
explicitly modeled, the initial plume concentrations were set equal to injected con-
centrations on the basis of simple physical considerations. The maximum doses can
be quite high, well above the current 1 mSv annual dose limit specified in NRB-96
(1996).
Examination of the 99Tc plume, representative of the migration of a nonsorbing
contaminant, shows several interesting features. This plume can be identified in
Figure 4.3a as the plume that rapidly moves away from the injection site. First,
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Figure 4.3 (continued). Horizon I intrusion doses: (b) 500 years; (c) 10,000 years.
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Table 4.6. Maximum doses from ingestion of water from Horizon I, Sv/yr.
Radio-
nuclide 500 years 1,000 years 3,000 years 5,000 years 10,000 years
241Am 5.0E+01 2.2E+01 9.1E-01 3.7E-02 1.2E-05
135Cs 1.8E-02 1.8E-02 1.8E-02 1.8E-02 1.8E-02
137Cs 3.0E-01 2.8E-06 2.4E-26 2.1E-46 1.4E-96
237Np 5.0E-01 5.0E-01 5.0E-01 5.0E-01 5.0E-01
239Pu 2.7E+01 2.6E+01 2.5E+01 2.3E+01 2.0E+01
90Sr 6.7E+00 4.5E-05 9.6E-26 2.0E-46 4.2E-98
99Tc 1.5E-01 1.5E-01 1.5E-01 1.5E-01 1.4E-01
Figure 4.4. Magnitude and direction of groundwater velocity in Horizon I.
the ultimate discharge area of the plume is highly sensitive to the location of the
injection well. Waste injected into the eastern wells (primarily ILW) will migrate
to the northeast, toward the Bolshoi Tel. Waste injected into the western wells,
however, will tend to migrate north and enter the depression north of the injection
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site. The divergence of the flow paths can be seen in a vector plot of the magnitude
and direction of groundwater velocity, shown in Figure 4.4.
Near the eastern end of the injection zone, the groundwater flows fairly rapidly
almost due east. Near the western end, the groundwater flows slowly to the north.
The capture area of the hypothesized fault zone breach in the northern section of
the controlled area can be seen where the velocities curve in to discharge through
the fault zone. This can be clearly seen in the plots of migration at 3,000 and 5,000
years in Figure 4.3a. At 3,000 years, a slight tail of the plume is captured by the
influence zone of the fault zone discharge area and begins migrating westward,
toward the fault zone. Between 3,000 and 5,000 years, the plume crosses through
the fault zone and enters the upthrown block. Between 5,000 and 10,000 years,
the plume begins to contact the hypothesized Yenisei River discharge area. A more
complete description of the northern head anomaly is found in Chapter 5.
In addition, the hypothesized area of discharge from Horizon I to Horizon II
under the Bolshoi Tel near the northeastern boundary of the controlled area can be
seen in Figure 4.4. The flow pattern indicates an area of groundwater discharge
to the northeast of the disposal site. As the lower boundary of Horizon I is com-
posed of impermeable crystalline rocks, this represents a discharge of waters from
Horizon I upward through the confining layer to Horizon II.
The results of waste migration modeling in Horizon II are considerably simpler.
The analysis was similar to that conducted in the Phase I report, but was refined by
the application of retardation coefficients and radioactive decay for modeling indi-
vidual plume constituents, providing a more realistic assessment of plume migra-
tion. The results of transport analysis are shown in Figure 4.5, where the boundary
of the contaminated plume is defined as the 1 mSv dose contour.
Because of the much higher level of sorption in Horizon II wastes, the plumes
are almost immobile and the short-lived radionuclides 90Sr and 137Cs decay rapidly
to below acceptable levels. This can be seen in Table 4.7, which shows the maxi-
mum doses from ingestion of water from Horizon II.
After 300 years, only 239Pu has the potential to generate doses above the 1 mSv
annual dose limit specified in NRB-96 (1996). However, even under the conserva-
tive assumption that the initial subsurface maximum concentration is equal to the
injected concentration, the annual dose is 7.3 mSv. The area impacted by the 239Pu
is expected to be small (see Figure 4.5). In addition, if dispersion or geochemi-
cal effects during waste injection result in a lowering of the 239Pu aqueous phase
concentration in the aquifer below that of the waste as injected, this dose will be
lowered and may potentially be reduced to below the 1 mSv annual dose limit
specified in NRB-96 (1996).
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Figure 4.5. Horizon II intrusion doses.
Table 4.7. Maximum doses from ingestion of water from Horizon II, Sv/yr.
Radionuclide 300 years 500 years 1,000 years
137Cs 1.5E-04 1.5E-06 1.4E-11
239Pu 7.3E-03 7.3E-03 7.2E-03
90Sr 8.5E-04 7.2E-06 4.9E-11
4.2 Analysis of Likelihood of Intrusion
A more complete evaluation of the likelihood of an intrusion will be prepared once
materials are available. The following factors govern the likelihood of an inadver-
tent intrusion in the future:
• failure of institutional controls
• groundwater potability
• aquifer yield
• aquifer depth and technical requirements for well placement
• area and location of contaminated plume
• alternative water supplies
25
Table 4.8. Classification of groundwater based on total dissolved
solids content.
Classification Total dissolved solids, mg/L
Fresh <1,000
Brackish 1,000–10,000
Saline 10,000–100,000
Brine > 100,000
Source: Fetter, 1988.
These factors are considered qualitatively in this section using the data that were
available to IIASA.
4.2.1 Failure of institutional controls
Institutional controls govern the chance that an individual will be allowed to drill
a water well within the restricted area. Institutional controls can be implemented
through a number of mechanisms, such as physical security or deed restrictions.
The length of time that institutional controls will remain effective is difficult to
determine. However, it can be assumed that after 500–1,000 years institutional
memory of the site will be lost, and that there will be no administrative control over
the territory of the disposal site. The decommissioning plans for the site will pre-
sumably address the details of the institutional controls to be implemented, allow-
ing a more complete evaluation of the effectiveness of planned institutional control
measures.
4.2.2 Groundwater potability
The second and third factors relate to the attractiveness of the subsurface aquifer as
a source of water. The potability of the water is of concern: water that is unfit for
consumption based on obvious characteristics such as salinity or turbidity will not
be used as a source of drinking water, even in the absence of institutional controls.
This is recognized by US regulations on drinking-water wells, in which waters with
a salinity greater that 10,000 milligrams per liter (mg/L) are not considered to be
viable sources of drinking water (Tsang, 1996). Fetter (1988) lists a classification
scheme for water based on total dissolved solids content (Table 4.8).
The classification of groundwater based on potential uses is also discussed by
Matthess (1982), who examines three use-based classifications: potable water, agri-
cultural water, and industrial water. Groundwater wells for potable water have
stringent requirements concerning their physical, chemical, and biological charac-
teristics.
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Water intended for agricultural use may have less stringent requirements, de-
pending on the use. Upper limits for total dissolved solids range from 2,860 mg/L
for poultry to 12,900 mg/L for fattening lambs. The requirements for irrigation wa-
ter are generally dependent on the salt-resistance of the crops grown. Water with
a sodium chloride (NaCl) content below 500 mg/L is considered always usable for
irrigation, whereas water with an NaCl content above 2,000 mg/L is considered
only of limited use and water above 4,000 mg/L is considered always unusable.
Water for industrial use has widely varying purity requirements, depending on
the use. Waters used in food processing should be at least as pure as potable wa-
ter. Water used for cooling generally should not be corrosive or contain microbial
agents that could cause fouling. The water requirements for steam generation de-
pend primarily on the boiler type. Low-pressure boilers can take waters with up
to 700 mg/L, whereas high-pressure boilers generally require waters with less than
0.5 mg/L. Based on these requirements, it appears that, with total salt contents of
under 300 mg/L (Rybalchenko et al., 1994), the subsurface waters in Horizons I
and II are suitable for potable or agricultural water and may be useful for some
industrial uses.
4.2.3 Aquifer yield
The second factor that affects the attractiveness of an aquifer as a source of drinking
water is aquifer yield. In the United States, domestic water well requirements can
range from 27 to 164 cubic meters per day (m3/d) (Driscoll, 1986). Wells used
strictly for domestic drinking water fall into the lower end of this range; domestic
agricultural wells fall into the higher end. Well fields for municipal or industrial
uses require considerably more water.
Driscoll (1986) gives rules of thumb regarding aquifer suitability based on
transmissivity. Aquifers with a transmissivity greater than 120 m2/d can be ade-
quate for industrial, municipal, or irrigation purposes, whereas those with a trans-
missivity less than 12 m2/d are generally suitable only for domestic wells. Freeze
and Cherry (1979) give a value of approximately 1,300 m2/d as indicative of an
aquifer with good possibilities for water extraction. Based on these values and on
the values of transmissivity given by Rybalchenko et al. (1994) and the data pack-
age (VNIPIPT, 1998) of 5–40 m2/d for Horizon I and 20–80 m2/d for Horizon II, it
appears that the aquifers are only suitable for domestic water well use. Municipal
or industrial use, which requires much greater quantities of water, is unlikely for
these aquifers.
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Table 4.9. Comparison of well-drilling methods.
Cable tool Direct rotary
Penetration ratea
Clay and silt 3 5
Loose sand and gravel 2 5
Poorly cemented sandstone 3 4
Well-cemented sandstone 3 3
Usual maximum depth, m 450 450
Maximum feasible depth 90–1,500 m, depending –
on well bore
Equipment Single-axle truck or trailer Multiple-axle truck
Comments Relatively low costs; easily High equipment costs;
operated; can be ope- requires experienced
rated in inaccessible ter- personnel; usually re-
rain; requires casing in quires special drilling
unconsolidated deposits fluids
a1 = impossible; 2 = difficult; 3 = slow; 4 = medium; 5 = rapid; and 6 = very rapid.
4.2.4 Aquifer depth and technical requirements for well placement
The fourth factor is the technical requirements for placing a well in the aquifers.
There currently are several different methods for drilling water wells. Of the meth-
ods currently available, only cable tool drilling and direct rotary drilling are likely
to reach the deep aquifers. Other methods, such as driven wells, augured wells, or
jetted wells, generally cannot be driven to the depths required to reach the contam-
inated aquifers. However, it is important to note that these simpler methods may be
able to reach the shallow Horizon III, leading to the use of this horizon as a source
of groundwater. A comparison of the two relevant methods is given in Table 4.9.
Based on the comparison, a cable tool rig is the type of drilling method most
likely to be used to reach the contaminated aquifer for a domestic well. However,
cable tool drilling to the aquifers would be expensive, and drilling using rotary
methods would be even more expensive. These figures indicate that the placement
of a water well would require substantial resources, making the aquifers an expen-
sive source of drinking water. However, a simpler variant of cable tool drilling
is a hand-operated percussion drill. Such drills have been in use for over 4,000
years and have proved capable of reaching great depths. Hand-operated percussion
rigs, constructed from bamboo, were used 4,000 years ago in China to complete
wells to depths of up to 915 m (Driscoll, 1986). Such a system, constructed from
available materials and operated by the inhabitants, could conceivably reach the
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contaminated aquifers. However, it would require enormous effort and is unlikely
to be attempted due to the availability of adequate water supplies at much shallower
depths.
4.2.5 Area and location of contaminated plume
The area and location of the contaminated plume affect the likelihood of inadvertent
intrusion. A contaminated plume extending over several square kilometers is far
more likely to be contacted than a plume extending over only a few hundred square
meters. In addition, the location of the plume relative to the surface is relevant.
Placement of a water well is usually preceded by a surface survey to determine the
best chance of finding water. Wells may be more likely to be attempted in valleys
than in highlands, as the chance of locating water is generally higher in these areas.
This indicates that the area of the injection site would not be considered as favorable
a site for a successful water well as the Bolshoi Tel valley or the Yenisei River
floodplain. Based on the results of the consequence analysis above, the existing
injection field will yield the highest dose due to inadvertent intrusion. However,
two factors mitigate this consequence:
• The surface area yielding high doses is very limited. A well would have to be
located very close to the existing injection site to contact this plume.
• The area where maximum doses would occur is located close to the regional
maximum elevation. Current practice among well contractors would favor a site
located closer to the river valleys or floodplains. This may lead to an increase
in the significance of the 99Tc plume, which may reach this area.
4.2.6 Alternative water supplies
A major factor in preventing an inadvertent intrusion into the aquifers is the pres-
ence of more economically viable water supplies. There are three potential alternate
water supplies: water in Horizon III, surface water features, and rainwater.
It has been shown in the consequence analysis that the area of primary con-
cern for intrusion is the area where injection operations are occurring. High lev-
els of sorption will tend to immobilize the most significant contaminants, 239Pu
and 241Am. Because of the high degree of sorption and the very low groundwa-
ter migration rate, these contaminants will move only a short distance even over
thousands of years. Therefore, the presence of adequate quantities of good-quality
groundwater overlying these areas will minimize the chance that a prospective do-
mestic well driller would continue to sink a shaft below a viable source of drinking
water. Horizon III is present above the injection site as a relatively homogeneous
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Table 4.10. Annual average precipitation (mm) and temperature (◦C) in the
Zheleznogorsk region.
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
Temperature –18.3 –15.9 –7.9 1.7 9.1 16.4 19.4 16.2 9.6 1.6 –9.1 –16.6 0.5
Precipitation 15 12 15 27 43 57 84 76 51 41 34 24 479
Water supply
ratea 5 4 5 9 14 19 28 25 17 13 11 8 13
aLiters per day, based on a 10 m2 catchment area.
sandy layer ∼20–50 m thick, at a depth of ∼60 m. Although data on the geohy-
drology of this horizon were not available, it seems reasonable to assume that this
layer is saturated and that the hydraulic conductivity is at least as high as that of the
deeper aquifers. For purposes of a domestic well, this aquifer seems to be quite ad-
equate. In addition, the much shallower depth would make this aquifer reasonably
accessible using most simple drilling methods.
Another potential alternate water supply is surface water. However, no sig-
nificant surface water features are indicated in the area of the injection site. The
distance to flowing surface water, either the Yenisei or the Bolshoi Tel, is several
kilometers. The use of river water in the area of the site would thus require a piped
water system and, given the potential for pollution of surface water, may not be
attractive.
The final alternate water supply is rainwater. The annual average precipitation
is given in Table 4.10. Depending on the catchment area of a cistern and the water
supply needs of a household, precipitation may be adequate to provide water during
the summer and autumn months. Precipitation during the winter is relatively low,
however, and combined with the very low temperatures during this time, it would
be quite difficult to keep a water system free of ice. A water tank buried below
the freeze line would be necessary to provide a year-round water supply based
on precipitation. Rain-based water supplies therefore do not seem to be a viable
year-round water supply solution for a residence near the injection site.
Based on a brief overview of alternate water supplies, the most likely source
of water for a residence or small community in the region of the injection area is
groundwater from Horizon III or a shallower water-table aquifer. This indicates the
need to prevent the introduction of contamination into Horizon III from the deeper
disposal horizons. Fortunately, the likelihood of contamination from Horizon I is
low at the disposal site because of the head difference between Horizons I and II
in these areas. If a breach were to occur in the confining layers between Hori-
zons I and II, the difference in water heads would cause downward water flow from
Horizon II to Horizon I. However, information on the head levels in Horizon III
is not available to IIASA. If the head levels are lower than in the deeper aquifers,
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a rupture in the confining layer between Horizon II and Horizon III may lead to
upward water flow and subsequent contamination of Horizon III. The most likely
cause of such a disruption would be a failure of the existing wells that penetrate
these layers. Such a failure could be of two types: either a failure of the grouting
between the formation and the casing string, which would lead to communication
between adjacent aquifers along the outside of the casing string; or a breach of the
grouting and casing string in the saturated zones, leading to a potential for commu-
nication between aquifers through the interior of the casing string. The likelihood
of either type of breach is dependent on the method and quality of the decommis-
sioning of the inactive wells after site shutdown. This may be analyzed in more
detail when the decommissioning plans of the site are known.
VNIPIPT (1998) divides the potential users of the groundwater at the site into
two groups: low-capacity users, such as domestic water supply wells for individual
households or small settlements; and high-capacity users, such as municipal water
wells. Low-capacity users could be expected to use, at most, up to only a few
hundred cubic meters per day. Municipal water supplies, on the other hand, would
require yields of over 50,000 m3/d. The groundwater resources at the site can
be divided into two groups: relatively shallow aquifers and deep aquifers. The
shallow aquifers include unconfined aquifers in the Quaternary sediments, aquifers
in the valleys of the Yenisei and Bolshoi Tel Rivers, and the confined aquifer in
Horizon III. These aquifers lie at depths of tens of meters to less than 100 meters
below ground. The deep aquifers include Horizons I and II, lying at depths greater
than 100 meters below the surface. Because of the synclinal nature of the formation,
in the injection area Horizon III lies approximately 90 m above Horizon II, and
Horizon II lies approximately 205 m above Horizon I.
Low-capacity users would be expected to use only the shallow aquifers. It is
likely that adequate fresh water would be encountered in the shallow Quaternary
deposits and no attempt would be made to reach the deeper disposal horizons. Pre-
vention of contamination of these overlying aquifers is important in preventing
unacceptable doses to future occupants of the site.
High-capacity municipal users, on the other hand, would be expected to use the
waters in the sediments under the the Bolshoi Tel or Yenisei Rivers. This is consis-
tent with the experiences at Seversk (Tomsk-7) and Zheleznogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-
26), where municipal water supplies are located in sedimentary deposits under
rivers, rather than in deep aquifers. In addition, the yield from the disposal aquifers
is expected to be too low for use as municipal water supplies. It was estimated
by VNIPIPT (1999) that extraction of 50,000 m3/d would consume all sources
of recharge in Horizon I and would require a network of over 100 wells, each
operating at the maximum sustainable Horizon I extraction rate of approximately
500 m3/d (see Table 5.1 for results from pumping tests). Because typical extraction
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Table 4.11. Water supplied from water wells.
Per capita water Number of people supplied
consumption by well producing:
Type of water supply rate, m3/d 180 m3/d 500 m3/d
Domestic user,
small rural settlement ∼0.06 3,000 8,300
Centralized water supply,
large rural settlement 0.12–0.16 1,100–1,500 3,100–4,200
Centralized water and heat
supply, urban settlement 0.23–0.35 500–780 1,400–2,200
Centralized water and heat
supply, major city 0.4–0.6 300–450 800–1,300
Table 4.12. Cost of well completion.
Depth Cost, 1,000 US dollars
Less than 100 m 2–4
∼350 m 30
800 m 550
1,500 m 1,000
Table 4.13. Per capita cost of well completion.
Per capita cost (US$) for
180 m3/d well completed to:
350 m 550 m
Centralized water supply, large rural settlement 20–27 370–490
Centralized water and heat supply, urban settlement 38–58 700–1,100
Centralized water and heat supply, major city 67–100 1,200–1,800
rates are lower (approximately 180 m3/d), it is more likely that over 300 wells
would be required.
For purposes of evaluation, Table 4.11 indicates the per capita water use in
the Russian Federation (VNIPIPT, 1999) and the number of people served by a
well operating at typical (180 m3/d) and maximum (500 m3/d) extraction rates. In
addition, Table 4.12 presents the data available on the cost of well completion to
different depths (VNIPIPT, 1999). Using the figures for a well producing 180 m3/d
and the figures for the per capita consumption rate, we can see that the per capita
cost of a well supplying a centralized water system would be as given in Table 4.13.
Based on these figures, it appears that individual households would be deterred
from completing a well by the high costs associated with the well and the inabil-
ity to spread the costs of well construction over many people. The large-capacity
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users, such as a major city, would be more likely to be deterred by the inability
to produce adequate amounts of water. However, a single well or a pair of wells
could supply a large rural settlement of several thousand households with a wa-
ter supply at a cost for well construction ranging from tens to hundreds of dollars
per household. Although this may be an expensive source of water, it is not out
of the reach of such a settlement. If alternate water supplies are not available, it
could be economically feasible to draw water from at least the upper Horizon II,
if not the shallower sections of Horizon I. It should be noted that surface waters
and shallow aquifers may be subject to other sources of pollution, such as improper
waste disposal techniques or pollution from agricultural sources. Deep aquifers are
therefore sometimes considered attractive because of their potential to offer clean
water supplies, unaffected by surface contamination conditions. This again points
to the need for the protection of the overlying aquifers as a protective buffer against
intrusion into the deeper disposal horizons.
The mobility of 99Tc may pose some problems, as this radionuclide may reach
the discharge area of the aquifer with subsurface concentrations in Horizon I, re-
sulting in doses well above 1 mSv per year. However, the plume would have to
migrate vertically through the confining layers of Horizons I and II to affect the
areas most likely to be used for drinking-water supplies. The combination of hor-
izontal and vertical travel time indicates that this is a problem that would occur
only after thousands of years. The seepage of this contaminant from the under-
lying layers would be mixed with the flow through the aquifer in which the well
is located. It is not possible to judge the significance of this pathway as no data
were available for modeling waste flow in Horizon III or the sub-riverbed aquifer.
Data on the hydraulic properties of the overlying aquifers and the interactions of
the rivers (Bolshoi Tel, Kan, and Yenisei) with the groundwater at the site would
allow a better understanding of potential consequences of 99Tc migration.
4.2.7 Summary
Water use from Horizons I and II cannot be ruled out on the basis of the existing
data concerning potability. The groundwater at these horizons appears to be of suf-
ficient quality for almost any use. However, we can see that the use of these aquifers
as a high-capacity municipal or industrial water source is likely to be ruled out by
the low transmissivity of the aquifers. Two factors reduce the likelihood that the
aquifers will be used for a domestic well. The first is the depth to the groundwater.
Although these aquifers are within the reach of any reasonably foreseeable tech-
nology, drilling such a well would require an enormous effort. It appears unlikely
that this level of effort would be undertaken by a domestic user. The other factor
is the presence of the overlying Horizon III, which is more likely to be exploited
by a domestic user than the deeper horizons. Although data were not available to
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Figure 4.6. Disposal zone and exclusion zone at the Severny site.
evaluate the attractiveness of Horizon III as a water supply, it seems reasonable to
assume that this aquifer would be exploited before a water well would be sunk into
the deeper horizons.
Concern about the doses calculated in this analysis must be tempered by the
recognition that risk is a function of both hazard and exposure. If there is no expo-
sure, there is no risk, even if the potential hazard is high. Several factors influence
the likelihood of an inadvertent intrusion into the disposal horizons, and hence the
likelihood of exposure to the waste. The first factor is the effectiveness of the in-
stitutional controls in preventing placement of a drinking-water well. As discussed
by Rybalchenko et al. (1994) and by VNIPIPT (1999), the area of the site is subject
to strict controls. Use of groundwater inside the disposal zone is prohibited. Use
of waters outside the disposal zone, but within the exclusion zone, is only allowed
in coordination with supervisory bodies. The location of these zones is shown in
Figure 4.6.
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It can be reasonably assumed that exposure via the drinking-water pathway will
not occur while institutional controls are effective. However, it can be expected
that, after some time, institutional knowledge of the existence and hazards of the
disposal site will be lost. Although it is not possible to predict exactly when this will
occur, it is reasonable to assume that it will occur within 500–1,000 years. After
this time, the likelihood of exposure will be governed by the the attractiveness of the
aquifers as a drinking-water supply. The subsurface waters at the site appear to be
fresh waters, with total salt contents under 300 mg/L. Although detailed chemical
analysis of the subsurface waters was not available, the extracted groundwater can
be considered potable water on the basis of the total salt content. Therefore, the
primary protective factors are the depth to the disposal aquifers and the yield of the
aquifers, coupled with the availability of alternate drinking-water supplies.
In summary, it appears that although the consequences of intrusion into the
deep aquifers could be severe, the likelihood of such intrusion is very low due to the
depth to the waste, the low yield of the aquifers, and the presence of more favorable
water supplies either in the shallow sedimentary deposits or in the sediments under
the Yenisei and Bolshoi Tel Rivers. The consequences of the high mobility of
99Tc are not clear but would be clarified by an examination of the dynamics of the
discharge areas of the disposal horizons and the overlying aquifers.
4.3 Conclusions
High subsurface concentrations of long-lived transuranic radionuclides will remain
in the Horizon I groundwater within the current site boundaries for tens of thou-
sands of years. These plumes will generally be limited in area and will migrate
extremely slowly, dissipating their concentrations through dispersion, diffusion,
and radioactive decay. Of all the long-lived radionuclides, only 99Tc will migrate
outside the site boundary in the next 10,000 years, reaching the northeastern site
boundary in approximately 1,000 years, passing through the fault zone north of
the site sometime between 3,000 and 5,000 years, and reaching the Yenisei River
discharge area in 5,000 to 10,000 years. If intrusion into the contaminated plume
were to occur, doses several orders of magnitude above the allowable level would
occur. The transuranic plumes, representing the most hazardous areas, are of lim-
ited extent. Intrusion into the peak of a transuranic plume and subsequent use of
the contaminated water as drinking water could lead to annual doses of over 1 Sv,
with 241Am and 239Pu contributing most of the dose. The 99Tc plume, representing
a substantially lower but still significant dose, is likely to disperse over a wide area,
with part of the plume discharging upward into Horizon II after thousands of years,
part discharging through the disturbance in the fault zone north of the site, and the
remainder continuing to migrate northward toward the Kan River. Intrusion into
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this more mobile plume and exploitation of the groundwater could result in annual
doses of up to 150 mSv.
In Horizon II, higher levels of sorption should retain the major radionuclides
(90Sr, 137Cs, and 239Pu) within the disposal area. Radioactive decay will reduce
the drinking-water dose from 90Sr and 137Cs to below permissible levels in less
than 300 years. The conservative analysis conducted here indicates that 239Pu will
remain at levels that could generate an annual dose of approximately 7.3 mSv.
However, several factors reduce the seriousness of the high doses determined in
the consequence analysis. The most important is the probability of exposure. Based
on a qualitative examination of the likelihood of groundwater intrusion into Hori-
zon I, there is very little chance that the high doses calculated in the consequence
analysis will actually be received. Although it is not possible to give a quantitative
estimate of this probability, the depth to the groundwater in Horizon I (and resulting
costs and effort to place a well) indicates a low probability of exposure, particularly
since there is more accessible water in Horizon III.
A second factor that must be considered in evaluating the significance of the
consequence analysis is the highly conservative nature of the analysis. The maxi-
mum concentrations in the subsurface were assumed to be the same as the concen-
tration in the injected waste. The initial distribution of long-lived radionuclides in
the subsurface, in both the solid and aqueous phases, will determine the potential
doses for tens of thousands of years. This is because the plumes tend to maintain
their geometry under conditions of regional flow, slowly being advected away from
the disposal zone. Unfortunately, detailed data required to accurately model the
near-field problem were not available. On the positive side, however, the data re-
quired to perform this analysis appear to exist within the responsible institutions
in Russia. In addition, if the plumes retain their geometry after injection ceases,
a great deal of insight may be gained from more detailed monitoring of individual
constituents during the decommissioning process. The reliance on modeling may
be considerably reduced by direct measurements of the aqueous phase concentra-
tion of long-lived radionuclides in the aquifer.
5
Failure of the Pravoberezhny Fault Zone
The area of waste disposal is displaced vertically in relation to the Yenisei River. In
the area of the disposal site, the sedimentary strata of Horizon I are in direct con-
tact with the crystalline rocks of the upthrown block with a displacement between
the blocks of between 250 m and 270 m. This leads to a relatively impermeable
boundary between the disposal area and the Yenisei River. However, a failure of
this fault, either at the disposal area or within the area of influence of the dis-
posed wastes, could lead to waste migration toward the Yenisei River. A failure
of the fault zone that results in the creation of a flow window toward the Yenisei
and consequent discharge of contaminated groundwater into the Yenisei River was
therefore evaluated. Studies related to a failure of the fault zone were carried out by
IIASA, IGEM, and VNIPIPT. VNIPIPT (1999) provided additional data and anal-
yses to support their assertion that the fault zone acts as a confining layer, limiting
migration toward the Yenisei River. IGEM (1999b) provided an analysis of the po-
tential failure modes of the fault zone, including the type and location of failure.
IIASA conducted an analysis of the changes in groundwater flow patterns and the
potential for contamination of the Yenisei River due to a failure of the fault zone.
5.1 Analysis of Fault Zone Geology near Deep Storage for
Liquid Radioactive Waste at the Mining and Chemical
Combine
A great deal of work has been carried out to evaluate the geology of the fault zone
and the role that it plays in preventing waste transport toward the Yenisei River.
The importance of the fault zone was recognized early in the process of designing
the repository. It was first studied intensively by a team of geologists from the
Krasnoyarsk Territorial Geological Administration in 1958. Since then, a variety
of studies have been performed to extend knowledge of the area. These range
from pumping tests and geophysical surveys carried out in the 1960s (Goncharov
and Nosukhin, 1963, 1965; Goncharov and Krivocheev, 1966, 1967) to more recent
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evaluations of the tectonic characteristics of the region of the disposal area (Lukina,
1994, 1996; Kupalov-Yaropolk et al., 1997).
5.1.1 The Pravoberezhny fault as a barrier to flow:
A review of the evidence
VNIPIPT provided evidence of the isolating properties of the fault zone under cur-
rent conditions. Some of the strongest evidence of the effectiveness of the fault
zone in limiting flow to the west is the difference in static water levels across the
fault zone and the distribution of heads in the downthrown block. The gradient
of hydraulic head near the fault zone is roughly north–northeast, or parallel to the
plane of the fault zone, as can be seen in Figure 5.1. This figure represents the head
pattern based on the calculations of VNIPIPT, as provided in the Phase I study
(VNIPIPT, 1998). This flow pattern, coupled with the difference in water heads
across the fault zone, indicates that the direction of flow in the disposal area is to
the north and east, rather than to the west across the fault zone.
In addition, pumping tests and geophysical surveys carried out prior to disposal
operations recorded a significant barrier to flow across the fault zone (Goncharov
and Nosukhin, 1965). A series of paired wells, one on either side of the fault
zone, was placed along the length of the fault zone, extending from wells C-46 and
C-31, located 5–6 km south of the injection array, to wells C-37 and C-33, located
4–5 km north of the injection array. Pumping tests were conducted to determine the
potential for groundwater flow across the fault zone. It was found that pumping of
the wells on one side of the fault zone did not influence water levels on the opposite
side of the fault. Table 5.1 provides the results of pumping tests conducted in wells
located across the fault zone; water levels in observation wells did not change in
any of the pumping tests shown in Table 5.1. The lack of water level change in
wells located on the opposite side of the fault zone can be interpreted as evidence
of the impermeability of the fault zone in the disposal region. This was taken as
evidence for the confining ability of the fault.
Finally, operational records from the site showing water level variations during
injection observations show no changes in water levels of wells in the upthrown
block, even though relatively high injection rates (∼300 m3/d in Horizon I and
∼600 m3/d in Horizon II) are maintained throughout much of the year. Figure 5.2
shows the head contours in the disposal area during injection. These provide strong
evidence that the fault zone serves as a barrier to flow for the contaminated ground-
water. These observations, coupled with the relative difference in static water heads
in wells across the fault zone (∼40 m in the area of the disposal site) and the isopo-
tential lines constructed from the pre-injection water levels in wells distributed
across the site, all point to the role of the fault zone in confining the contami-
nated waters of the disposal area from the Yenisei River. The perpendicularity of
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Figure 5.1. Hydraulic head distribution in Horizon I.
the isopotential lines to the fault zone in the region of waste disposal is indicative
of a no-flow barrier.
However, there is more ambiguity several kilometers to the north of the fault
zone, as can be seen in the water levels of wells C-4 and C-36. In well C-36, the
water head is 165.25 m; in the conjugate well C-4 of the upthrown block, the water
head is 143.17 m. This represents an anomaly if the water heads in the down-
thrown block are correct, as the water level in well C-36 should be approximately
173 m if a no-flow boundary is present in this region. In addition, the head in well
C-38 (163.7 m) is approximately 4 m lower than the head in well C-3 (167.78 m)
(see Figure 5.5a). The distance between these wells is only approximately 250 m,
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Table 5.1. Pumping tests across the Pravoberezhny fault zone.
Information on observation wells
Distance
Pumping Dis- Draw- Specific well Trans- from
time, charge, down, discharge, missivity, pumping
Well Horizon hours L/sec m L/sec/m m2/d Well Horizon well, m
C-30 II downthrown 238 1.85 47.0 0.04 8.3 C-46 Upthrown block 280
block crystalline basement
C-31 I downthrown 184 6.0 59.0 0.1 4.0 C-31 I downthrown 320
block C-46 Upthrown block
crystalline basement
C-35 I downthrown 169 1.2 185.0 0.006 1.2 C-30 II downthrown block 320
block C-28 I upthrown block 400
C-29 I upthrown block 250
C-36 I downthrown 299 1.3 74.7 0.017 1.3 C-4 I upthrown block 480
block C-3 II downthrown block 1010
P-5 I downthrown 76 1.0 86.9 0.011 0.9 P-8 I upthrown block 430
block
C-20 II downthrown 124 1.45 60.2 0.024 4.8 P-8 I upthrown block 230
block
P-8 I upthrown 212 0.54 18.6 0.029 9.0 C-1 II downthrown block 370
block
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Figure 5.2. Hydraulic heads in the disposal area during injection operations: (a)
plan view; (b) cross-section through fault zone.
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Figure 5.3. Difference in elevations between the upthrown and downthrown
blocks.
indicating a gradient toward the fault zone perpendicular to the gradient leading to
the Kan River.
Another piece of evidence for the gradual weakening of the confining ability
of the fault zone as it is traversed to the north is the difference in the elevation of
the upper boundary of Horizon I in the downthrown block and the elevation of the
basement rocks in the upthrown block. A plot of elevations was derived from con-
tours of the upper and lower surfaces of Horizon I provided by VNIPIPT (VNIPIPT,
1998) and is shown in Figure 5.3. The figure is a plot of the upper surface of the
downthrown block (in the east) and the lower surface of the upthrown block (in
the west). Care should be taken in interpretating this figure, as the elevation of the
layers near the fault zone is determined by extrapolation from more distant mea-
surements. In particular, this plot does not account for deformation of the layers
due to past vertical movement of the fault, and it shows an increase in separation to
the far north of the site (north of the Bolshoi Tel) that is likely an artifact of extrap-
olation. However, it does yield a picture of the trend in the separation of the two
blocks. It can be seen from the figure that this degree of separation is relatively high
in the neighborhood of the disposal area (over 150 m). In the region of the fault
zone bend, this difference drops dramatically. It is clear that in an area where the
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Figure 5.4. Separation of upthrown Horizon I basement and downthrown Horizon I
roof.
elevation of the upper surface of the downthrown block is higher than the elevation
of the lower surface of the upthrown block, there is a potential for the two sections
to be in hydraulic communication across the fault zone. According to this plot, the
difference in these two elevations (upthrown basement elevation–downthrown roof
elevation) is greater than zero along the entire length of the fault zone. However,
there is a sharp plunge in the difference between these elevations in the area of the
fault zone bend. This can be seen more clearly in Figure 5.4. It is interesting to note
that this sudden plunge in the difference in elevations corresponds to the location
of the anomalous well heads in wells C-4 and C-36 (see Figure 5.1).
Cross-sections of the fault zone in this region confirm this decrease in the am-
plitude of the fault zone displacement north of the disposal ground. This can be
seen more clearly in the cross-section of the fault zone between wells C-3 (down-
thrown) and C-39 (upthrown) (Figure 5.5a). These wells are located to the north of
the area of the fault zone bend. Finally, continuing to the north, the cross-section
between wells C-33 and C-37 (Figure 5.5b) shows an area where the sands and
sandstones of the downthrown Horizon I are in direct contact with the sedimentary
deposits of the upthrown block, rather than in contact with the crystalline basement
rock.
The large elevation difference in the two blocks near the injection wells, the
lack of a plausible mechanism of fault zone failure in this area, and the difference
in static and dynamic water heads in the region all point to the likelihood that the
fault zone is and will remain an effective barrier in the vicinity of the disposal area.
The evidence points to the region north of the disposal area, either in the bend of
the fault zone or slightly north of it, as the most likely area for a disruption in the
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Figure 5.5. Geologic sections: (a) line connecting wells C-39 and C-3; (b) line
connecting wells C-37 and C-33. (1) Permeable rocks: sands (a), sandstones (b),
and gravel sands (c); (2) impermeable rocks: Quaternary sediments (a) and clays
(b); (3) basement rocks; (4) symbols for horizons; (5) altitudes of groundwater
heads in meters.
fault zone and a flow window toward the Yenisei River. This conclusion is also
supported by tectonic evidence and is discussed in the section below.
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5.1.2 Disjunctive tectonics of the Yenisei–Kan interfluvial area
The tectonic characteristics of the disposal region were examined by IGEM (1999b)
to evaluate the potential failure modes of the fault zone. Their report forms the
basis of this section. To evaluate the potential for adverse seismic activity at the
site, a general overview of published and archived geologic–geophysical materials
characterizing the composition and development history of the investigated region
are discussed below.
The Yenisei–Kan interfluvial area is located near the conjunction of the three
largest geotectonic elements of the Asian continent: the ancient Siberian platform,
the epi-Paleozoic West Siberian plate, and the Altai–Sayan orogenic area. The gen-
eral geological characteristics of this area are given in Figure 5.6. The interfluvial
region is separated from these three geotectonic units by regional fault zones: from
the northwest by the Yenisei fault, from the south by the Iisk–Kan fault, and from
the east by the Kan–Yenisei fault. The interfluvial region lies between the Siberian
platform (absolute elevations from 90–120 m up to 370 m) and the northwestern
spurs of Altai–Sayan area, where the modern surface elevation reaches 700–800 m.
Three blocks can be identified from maps of local gravitational field anomalies
(Figure 5.7). In the central block, with gravitational fields varying from 0 to –20
milligals, rocks of granitoid composition, gneissic granite, and crystalline schists
predominate. Flanking the central block are northeastern and southwestern blocks
composed of more dense Archean–Proterozoic gneisses and schists, characterized
by gravitation fields from 0 up to +15 milligals.
The location and morphology of interblock faults have been investigated in de-
tail by Lukina (1994, 1996) as well as by Kupalov-Yaropolk et al. (1997). The
following description is based on the work of these researchers. There are sev-
eral faults in the region of the disposal area, as shown in Figure 5.8. Fault zones
can be divided into two groups, ancient and modern, and are the most charac-
teristic structural elements of the interfluvial geology (Lukina, 1994, 1996). An-
cient faults are typically surface dislocations of Archean–Proterozoic intrusive-
metamorphic sediments. Some ancient faults may have been rejuvenated in the
Cenozoic era, possibly as late as the Quaternary period. Modern ruptures were
created in the Quaternary period and displace late Pliocene surfaces. These faults
divide the Yenisei–Kan interfluvial area into a series of relatively narrow tectonic
blocks of submeridional (north–northwestern) strike. A stepwise increase from
east (the Yeniseisk ridge of the Siberian platform) to west (the Siberian plate) of
the Archean–Proterozoic metamorphic basement amounts to 1,600 m, and the Pa-
leozoic basement depth increases in a similar fashion by a total of 1,300 m (Lukina,
1996). The primary faults near the disposal area are the Pravoberezhny (or “Right
Bank”) fault to the west and the Telskii Byk fault to the north (see Figure 5.8).
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Figure 5.6. Geologic scheme of the Yenisei–Kan interfluvial area (redrawn from
the 1963 Geologic map of the USSR) and position of the Pravoberezhny fault.
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Figure 5.7. Map of the Yenisei–Kan interfluvial gravitational field anomalies for
depth interval 12–25 km, in milligals.
The eastern boundary of the Yenisei–Kan interfluvial area is the north–
northwest-striking Kan–Yenisei fault. This fault is reflected in the valleys of the
Kan and Yenisei Rivers (Figure 5.8). A vertical Quaternary displacement of the late
Pliocene surface can be distinctly traced along the fault, resulting in the uplift of
the eastern block of the fault over the western block by approximately 250–290 m.
Where the valley of the Kan River coincides with this fault, it has a canyon-like
form and is characterized by steep slopes and a lack of terraces, thereby provid-
ing evidence of Quaternary tectonic movements. The Kan–Yenisei fault is dis-
tinctly marked by the zones of elevated horizontal gradients in gravitation fields
(Vashchilov et al., 1979). Gravimetric data indicate a fault depth of 25–34 km in
the southern part of the interfluvial region, decreasing to 7.5–15 km in the north-
ern part (Figure 5.9). The southern border of the Yenisei–Kan interfluvial area is
the Iisk–Kan fault of west–northwest strike, separating the interfluvial region from
the spurs of the Altai–Sayan region. The total vertical displacement of crystalline
basement surfaces along this fault reaches 300–400 m. The fault can be seen in the
modern relief as a sharply expressed scarp. The formation of this scarp occurred
during the middle Pleistocene displacements of Yenisei River terraces, between
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Figure 5.8. Fault lines in the vicinity of the Severny disposal site (after Kupalov-
Yaropolk et al., 1997, and Lukina, 1994, 1996). Faults (figures in circles): (1)
Iisk–Kan, (2) Kan–Yenisei, (3) Malyi Itat, (4) Bolshoi Itat, (5) Malyi Tel, (6) Tel-
skii Byk, (7) Bolshoi Tel, (8) Pravoberezhny, (9) Atamanovsk, (10) Muratovsk,
(11) Krasnoyarsk I, (12) Krasnoyarsk II, (13) Sosnovoborsk, (14) fragments of the
Yenisei fault zone.
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Figure 5.9. Location and depth of Kan–Yenisei and Iisk–Yenisei faults based on
gravimetric data (Vashchilov et al., 1979).
130,000 and 200,000 years ago (Lukina, 1994). Neotectonic activity of the Iisk–
Kan fault is also reflected in the morphology of the bed of the Yenisei River. In
the southern fault wing the riverbed is narrow, with steep shores; in the northern
wing the riverbed widens considerably, resulting in the presence of islands and river
shallows. The Iisk–Kan fault is distinctly visible in gravitational field maps of the
Yenisei–Kan interfluvial area as zones of elevated horizontal gravity gradients (see
Figure 5.7). Gravimetric data indicate a fault depth of 25–34 km (Vashchilov et al.,
1979). The northern boundary of the interfluvial region is the Yenisei fault, rep-
resented by a wide (4–5 km) band of echelon-like converged rupture disturbances
striking northeast (Figure 5.8) along the valley of the Yenisei River. Vertical dis-
placements are not marked along these ruptures, suggesting that the Yenisei fault
originated under the influence of tectonic tension stresses (Lukina, 1996).
The Pravoberezhny fault, located in the western section of the interfluvial re-
gion has a submeridional strike. In the southern half of the Yenisei–Kan interfluvial
area this fault forms the western boundary of a lower plate of granite–gneissic base-
ment rocks. To the north, in the region of the injection site, the extent of Jurassic
sediments increases sharply. These sedimentary deposits overlap not only the east-
ern crystalline basement rocks, but also the western blocks. However, based on
drilling data (Rybalchenko et al., 1994), the thickness of Jurassic sediments in the
western (upthrown) block is approximately 250 m, whereas in the eastern block
the sediments are over 500 m deep. To the north of the disposal site allotment
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boundary, the existence of a fault provisionally named the Telskii Byk fault has
been proposed based on a number of geomorphological and geological signs. This
fault strikes northwest along the valley of the Bolshoi Tel River. Interpretation of
aerial photography of this valley indicates a vertical displacement of Quaternary
deposits of approximately 50 m.
The Malyi Itat and Bolshoi Itat faults, also located in the western sections of
the interfluvial region, are visible in the valleys of the Malyi Itat and Bolshoi Itat
Rivers. Both faults are characterized by vertical displacements of late Pliocene
formations of up to 60 m and 100 m, respectively. Activity of these faults during
the Quaternary period has resulted in canyon-like valleys with steep slopes and a
corresponding absence of terraces and floodplains. The depth of the Malyi Itat fault
has been estimated by experts from Saint Petersburg University to be approximately
1.5 km.
The Malyi Tel fault occurs at the boundary between the two blocks and coin-
cides with the valley of the Malyi Tel River. Granites and gneisses are exposed at
the surface of the eastern block. In the western block, these rocks occur 350–380 m
below the surface and are overlain by Jurassic sediments. In the modern relief, the
fault is expressed by a distinct ledge that originated as a result of shifts during the
late Pleistocene and Holocene epochs.
A group of converged conjugated fault zones of submeridional north–northwest
strike (including the Atamanovsk, Muratovsk, Krasnoyarsk I, and Krasnoyarsk II
faults) is located to the east of the Pravoberezhny fault (see Figure 5.8). All of these
faults are sufficiently expressed in the geomorphology of the modern relief to be
visible in satellite photographs. These faults separate structural blocks with various
elevations of the crystalline basement (Lukina, 1994, 1996). The most considerable
among them is Muratovsk fault, with a total vertical displacement reaching 500 m.
In summary, a series of submeridional faults, and a lesser number of northwest-
striking faults, can be detected in the Yenisei–Kan interfluvial area on the basis of
geomorphological, geological, and geophysical data. Displacements of ancient sur-
faces, layered Jurassic sedimentary rocks, and Quaternary sediments are observed
along these faults, with the exception of the Yenisei fault. It is significant that these
shifts at all of the faults investigated above are caused by vertical tectonic move-
ments. The Pravoberezhny fault, investigated in particular in this report, is among
these rupture structures. It is a linear mobile zone that has developed over a long
period of time and has periodically been rejuvenated by tectonic movements in vari-
ous periods of regional tectonic deformations, including the Quaternary. Therefore,
the supposition of an adverse impact on the confining capacity of the Pravoberezhny
fault as a result of longitudinal tectonic shifts that create “filtration windows” seems
to be sufficiently substantiated.
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5.1.3 Potential failure modes of the Pravoberezhny fault
The role that the Pravoberezhny fault zone plays in preventing flow toward the Yeni-
sei River is discussed in Section 5.1.1. An evaluation of the mechanism, likelihood,
and consequences of a disturbance of the isolating properties of the Pravoberezhny
fault zone as a result of tectonic activity is important in evaluating the overall safety
of the repository. Based on evaluation of available data, the IGEM report (IGEM,
1999b) concluded that the Pravoberezhny fault is most likely to suffer a loss of its
confining properties as a result of either of two types of geological events:
• rejuvenation of the fault zone by longitudinal tectonic movements, with a con-
sequent opening of filtration windows in the fault zone
• disruption of the continuity of the Pravoberezhny fault as a result of its being
crossed by new or reactivated transverse faults.
These are discussed in more detail below.
Loss of the Confining Properties as a Result of Longitudinal Tectonic Movements
The research summarized here indicates that post-Jurassic vertical displacements in
the disposal site region along the Pravoberezhny fault have amounted to more than
250–270 m. These displacements are substantiated by the sharp increase in the dip
angle of the beds of Jurassic sediments in the immediate vicinity of the fault plane
in both the eastern and western blocks (see Figure 5.5). The sedimentary layers
indicate that post-Jurassic upthrusting tectonic shifts occurred in the plane of the
Pravoberezhny fault. It is rather difficult to date these displacements more accu-
rately. However, there are indications of neotectonic mobility of the Pravoberezhny
fault. A 4–10 m scarp coinciding with the fault plane can be seen in modern re-
lief (Lukina, 1994, 1996). Vertical shifting of early and later Holocene surfaces is
visible along this scarp. The total amplitude of vertical displacements along the
Pravoberezhny fault decreases to the north of the injection site, reaching only 75 m
in the region of the Bolshoi Tel River. As noted above, based on the results of anal-
yses of the Yenisei–Kan interfluvial area fault tectonics, vertical movements are the
most probable rejuvenation mechanisms of the faults discussed here, including the
Pravoberezhny fault. In the event the Pravoberezhny fault is activated, displace-
ments would most likely occur along the most heterogeneous interior linear fault
zones or along the plane of contact of the fault zone with the host rocks. In this
case, significant degradation of the thin clay horizon that represents the ancient tec-
tonic Pravoberezhny fault seam is not likely. Disturbances of this seam continuity
may occur at places of fault flattening, where the clay horizon may be crushed and
ruptured. This may result in the creation of filtration windows. Unfortunately, a
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Figure 5.10. Fault zone failure during horizontal displacements: (a) southerly and
(b) northerly displacement of downthrown block.
quantitative estimation for this scenario is not possible because of the lack of data
on the deep morphology of the Pravoberezhny fault.
A more serious failure would occur if fault movements included a horizon-
tal component in addition to the vertical displacement discussed previously. Such
strike-slip fault movements could disturb seam integrity north of the injection zone,
in the region where the Pravoberezhny fault displaces an arched bend (Figure 5.10).
A horizontal strike-slip vector such as that noted in Figure 5.10 could result in
crushing, ruptures, and disintegration on one side of the bend, while the other
side could experience exfoliation and formation of open cavities. A reversal of
the strike-slip orientation would simply interchange the location of these types of
failures. Depending on the magnitude of the horizontal strike-slip movement, the
resulting disruption could extend several hundred meters along the fault zone. We
caution that these evaluations are only rough approximations. Special investiga-
tions are necessary for more accurate determination of the degree of disturbance of
the screen horizon.
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Rupture of the Pravoberezhny Fault as a Result of its Displacement by a Transverse
Rupture Disturbance
In addition to rejuvenation and vertical movements within the Pravoberezhny fault,
failure of the confining ability of the fault zone could also occur as a result of its
intersection by a transverse rupture disturbance caused by activation of the Telskii
Byk fault. According to Lukina (1996), this fault crosses the Pravoberezhny fault
zone near the northern boundary of the allotment area (Figure 5.8). Analysis of
geologic and topographic maps of the region to the west of the Yenisei River shows
that there are a number of linear elements of northwestern orientation in the current
surface relief, in the separate river valley orientations, and in the geologic struc-
tures of this region. Thus it is possible that the Telskii Byk fault is continued to
the west of the Pravoberezhny fault. Taking these data into account, it is not im-
probable that activation of the Telskii Byk fault may cause a continuity rupture of
the Pravoberezhny fault at the point where these two faults intersect. Taking into
account that the Pravoberezhny fault zone dips to the east, fault shifts along the
Telskii Byk fault would lead to displacement of the section of the Pravoberezhny
fault located to the south of the Telskii Byk fault. In this case, the displacement
value would depend on the fault amplitude. The strike-slip displacement would
depend on the orientation of the horizontal component. A rejuvenation could either
increase or decrease the displacement. However, in either case, a continuity rupture
of the Pravoberezhny fault could disturb the integrity of the clay seam that acts as
a confining barrier.
5.2 Consequence Analysis
5.2.1 Input data and assumptions
The basic assumptions regarding the geology and hydrology of the site, waste data,
and migration parameters used for this scenario are identical to those discussed in
Chapter 4 for the inadvertent intrusion scenario. The only alteration made in con-
ducting the fault zone failure analysis was a change in the transmissivity properties
of the fault zone; all other assumptions, input data, and modeling are identical.
However, there are few or no data on Horizon II in the region between the fault
zone and the Yenisei River. The lack of adequate data in this region precluded
modeling of consequences in Horizon II. However, it is important to note that the
results of the inadvertent intrusion base case analysis indicate that the LLW in Hori-
zon II is strongly sorbed and does not migrate far before it decays. It is expected
that this conclusion would also have been reached for the scenario of a fault zone
failure had sufficient data been available for modeling. However, in the absence of
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data, we cannot make any conclusions regarding the impact of a fault zone failure
on injected wastes in Horizon II.
The modeled conductivity of the fault zone was determined using a simple pro-
cedure. Based on the discussion above, it was assumed that the leakage through the
fault zone that is hypothesized to be occurring at present is a function of the differ-
ence in the elevation of the upthrown and downthrown blocks. It was assumed that
the head anomaly in the region of wells C-4 and C-36 represents a region of flow
through the fault zone and that this flow window coincides with the minimum of
the difference in elevations. A value of 10−4 m/d was given by VNIPIPT (1998)
as the normal hydraulic conductivity of the fault zone. This value is over two or-
ders of magnitude lower than the normal conductivity in the aquifer, which ranges
between 0.3 and 1.6 m/d according to Rybalchenko et al. (1994). This results in
a fault zone that is effectively a barrier to flow. Calibration of the conductivity of
the fault zone was conducted on a trial-and-error basis. It was found that a max-
imum fault zone conductivity set at 3 ×10−3 m/d was adequate to reproduce the
head anomaly observed in the region of wells C-4 and C-36, where the difference
between the elevation of the upthrown and downthrown blocks is at a minimum. In
order to develop a systematic approach that preserves the high resistance to flow in
the disposal region while allowing heads to be reproduced more accurately in the
northern section of the site, a simple log-linear relationship was then used to derive
an expression for the relationship between the fault displacement and the hydraulic
conductivity of the fault zone:
K = 0.003 × 10−0.02×Z , (5.5)
where K is the hydraulic conductivity (in m/d) and Z is the difference in elevation
between the roof of the downthrown block and the floor of the upthrown block (in
m). It is important to note that this relationship is based on mathematical conve-
nience rather than physical principles of fault zone morphology. It is simply a way
to systematically preserve the integrity of the fault zone in areas where there is a
large difference in the elevations of the upthrown and downthrown blocks while
determining the likely areas of failure of the fault zone due to vertical displace-
ment. A vertical displacement of the fault zone is assumed to bring the upthrown
and downthrown blocks into hydraulic contact. There are other, and possibly more
likely, failure modes of the fault zone, as discussed previously. However, the most
likely areas of disruption for all potential failure mechanisms are in the northern
and southern sections of the fault zone arch. These roughly coincide with the areas
that would be affected by a vertical displacement, and therefore the model, which
is simply based on altering the conductivity of the fault zone without reference to
the mechanism by which the conductivity is altered, is still adequate for modeling
purposes.
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Figure 5.11. (a) Block separation and (b) modeled hydraulic conductivity along
the fault zone.
The conductivities thus generated were used in the model for the base case
to model the fault zone. It was assumed that the fault zone fails as a result of
a vertical shift of 50 m, thus bringing the upthrown and downthrown blocks into
direct contact. The area over which the contact is developed is thus a function of
the relative difference in elevations. This can be seen in Figure 5.11a, showing the
relative elevations before and after a shift of the fault zone. Figure 5.11b shows the
hydraulic conductivity along the fault zone in both the base case and the fault zone
failure scenarios. The conductivity of the fault zone was capped to be consistent
with the hydraulic conductivity of the areas on either side of the fault zone. This
results in the truncation of the hydraulic conductivity plot shown in Figure 5.11b to
a maximum of 5 ×10−2 m/d. The number of cells in the fault zone affected by the
shift is given in Table 5.2.
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Table 5.2. Number of model cells affected by fault zone (assumptions).
Hydraulic conductivity,
m/d Maximum >10−2 >10−3 >10−4
Base case scenario 3 ×10−3 0 (0%) 15 (9%) 34 (20%)
Fault zone failure scenario 3 ×10−2 16 (9%) 29 (17%) 93 (55%)
Figure 5.12. Modeled heads in Horizon I after failure of the fault zone.
Apart from the altered hydraulic conductivity of the fault zone, the input files
for modeling were identical for both the base case and the fault zone failure
scenarios.
5.2.2 Results
The results of hydraulic modeling of Horizon I are shown in Figure 5.12. One of
the most important results is that, even though there is an order of magnitude shift
and a large breach in the fault zone, the head patterns do not change dramatically
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Figure 5.13. Change in modeled heads as a result of fault zone failure.
compared with the results from the base case modeling. This can be seen in Fig-
ure 5.13, showing the difference in the heads between the base case and the fault
zone failure scenarios. The heads of the downthrown block in the immediate vicin-
ity of the breach drop by as much as 10 m as a result of the increased discharge
through the fault zone. However, away from the rupture, the head difference drops
off, and there is very little change in modeled heads in the eastern section of the
site, as seen in Figures 5.12 and 5.13. This is thought to be due to the very low
transmissivity in the downthrown block north of the injection area between the dis-
posal area and the area of postulated fault zone failure. The low transmissivities in
this region may thus act as a “shield” that mitigates the effect of a breach in the fault
zone, preventing it from having a widespread impact on the aquifer. This can also
be seen in a velocity plot of the groundwater in Horizon I, shown in Figure 5.14.
The results of transport modeling are shown in Figure 5.15. The same method-
ology applied in the inadvertent intrusion scenario (see Chapter 4) is applied here.
The doses from the individual radionuclides in both the HLW and the ILW are
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Figure 5.14. Magnitude and direction of groundwater velocity in Horizon I as a
result of a fault zone failure.
summed at each point in the aquifer to give the total dose resulting from all ra-
dionuclides at each point in the aquifer. Dose contours are given for 1 mSv in
Figure 5.15a and for 1 mSv, 10 mSv, 100 mSv, and 1 Sv in Figures 5.15b and
5.15c.
The primary effect of a failure of the fault zone is the earlier arrival of the 99Tc
plume at the Yenisei River. It arrives at the Yenisei River at around 3,000 years and
peaks between 3,000 and 10,000 years. In addition, a slight amount of ILW, injected
into the eastern wells, is captured by the increased area of influence of the fault
zone rupture. This results in a longer period of discharge into the Yenisei River.
However, the sorbed contaminants do not reach the area of the fault zone rupture.
Sorption will keep the plumes within the downthrown block for the next 10,000
years, although they will move slightly faster than in the intact fault zone scenario.
The maximum intrusion doses (Table 5.3) are identical to those obtained in the base
case intrusion report (cf. Table 4.6). For sorbed contaminants, there is no significant
change in either the maximum concentration or the plume location. For nonsorbed
(or weakly sorbed) contaminants, such as 99Tc, the maximum concentrations are
similar in both cases; only the location of the plume changes significantly.
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Figure 5.15. Horizon I intrusion doses after failure of fault zone: (a) from 500 to
10,000 years.
Doses were also calculated for the case of discharge to the Yenisei River. Only
nonsorbed contaminants reach the Yenisei River boundary during the time frame
of this analysis (10,000 years). A conservative approach similar to that taken in the
Phase I report was used to estimate discharge into the river. Contaminants reaching
the Yenisei River boundary and discharged in the constant head cells are assumed
to be instantaneously advected into the river and mixed with the river flow. Ac-
cording to historical discharge data before the construction of the Krasnoyarsk dam
(Kosmakov, 1996), the Yenisei River has an average annual flow of 2,920 m3/sec,
and an average minimum flow of 1,980 m3/sec. In keeping with the conservative
approach the average minimum annual flow was used as the river discharge. The
59
Figure 5.15 (continued). Horizon I intrusion doses after failure of fault zone: (b)
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Table 5.3. Maximum doses from ingestion of water from Horizon I after failure of
fault zone, Sv/yr.
Radio-
nuclide 500 years 1,000 years 3,000 years 5,000 years 10,000 years
241Am 5.0E+01 2.2E+01 9.1E-01 3.7E-02 1.2E-05
135Cs 1.8E-02 1.8E-02 1.8E-02 1.8E-02 1.8E-02
137Cs 3.0E-01 2.8E-06 2.4E-26 2.1E-46 1.4E-96
237Np 5.0E-01 5.0E-01 5.0E-01 5.0E-01 5.0E-01
239Pu 2.7E+01 2.6E+01 2.5E+01 2.3E+01 2.0E+01
90Sr 6.7E+00 4.5E-05 9.6E-26 2.0E-46 4.2E-98
99Tc 1.5E-01 1.5E-01 1.5E-01 1.5E-01 1.4E-01
annual flow, rather than the monthly flow, is used, as the dose limit is calculated on
an annual basis. The same caveats apply to this analysis as applied to the Phase I
study. This analysis yields a maximum upper bound on the concentration in the
river water, not a best estimate of the concentration. Because of the much greater
discharge in the Yenisei River, the maximum annual doses will be much lower than
the values calculated for the Bolshoi Tel in Phase I, reaching a maximum of only
7.2 ×10−10 Sv, far below the 1 mSv annual dose limit specified in NRB-96 (1996).
5.3 Conclusions
Based on the preceding analysis, the primary effect of a failure of the fault zone
would be the earlier arrival of the 99Tc plume in the upthrown block and at the
Yenisei River, and a longer period of discharge into the Yenisei, as the breach in
the fault zone captures a portion of the ILW plume. The most likely area for a
failure of the fault zone is the section approximately 3–4 km north of the injection
site, in the area of the arched bend of the existing fault zone. The maximum doses
would not be significantly changed, although changes in the location and arrival
time of peak doses would occur.
6
Conclusions and Recommendations
6.1 Inadvertent Intrusion Scenario
1. The consequences of an inadvertent intrusion into Horizon I will lead to doses
several orders of magnitude above the current 1 mSv dose limit (specified in
NRB-96, 1996) for at least the next 10,000 years, and for potentially much
longer. Institutional controls, by themselves, are insufficient to prevent unac-
ceptable exposures. However, the likelihood of such an intrusion is low owing
to the effort required to reach the areas of contamination and the availability
of more attractive groundwater resources at much shallower depths.
The consequences of an intrusion into Horizon I, considered under the worst
possible case (location of a drinking-water well directly in the region of the injec-
tion site), would lead to unacceptable doses for over 10,000 years. This dose would
be due to the long-lived transuranic radionuclides – primarily 239Pu and 241Am for
the next several thousand years, and 239Pu and 237Np after 10,000 years. A highly
conservative estimate results in a maximum annual dose of over 10 Sv per year, as
seen in Figure 4.3 and in Table 4.6.
However, the likelihood of this event is low. Although the groundwater in Hori-
zon I is fresh, and thus suitable for drinking water, the transmissivity of the aquifer
is too low to sustain a large drinking-water system, for which transmissivities ex-
ceeding 100 m2/d are generally required. Therefore, the only feasible sustainable
well in Horizon I would likely be a small community well. In addition, in drilling
a well in the area of maximum risk, one would encounter potable groundwater in
Horizon III at far shallower depths. There is no reason to assume that a potable
water well would bypass the usable water in Horizon III and, after several hundred
years, the usable groundwater in Horizon II, and attempt to exploit the far deeper
Horizon I. Finally, the areas resulting in high doses are small, and the likelihood
that a well would be so precisely placed as to hit the peak of a contaminated plume
is therefore small, even if such a well were attempted (areas of potential hazard are
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shown in Figure 4.6). Therefore, the likelihood of exposure to the high groundwa-
ter concentrations in Horizon I is very low, and the risk posed by the contaminated
groundwater in Horizon I, being a function of both consequence and probability, is
thus low.
2. The consequences of an inadvertent intrusion into Horizon II could result in
doses above the current 1 mSv annual limit (specified in NRB-96, 1996) for
a period of a few hundred years. Institutional controls would need to remain
effective for approximately 300 years. However, although the likelihood of an
intrusion into Horizon II is higher than that of an intrusion into Horizon I, it is
still low.
The values of maximum doses resulting from intrusion into Horizon II are pre-
sented in Table 4.7 and in Figure 4.5. After 300 years, only 239Pu is capable of
resulting in annual doses above 1 mSv, and even that is conservatively estimated to
be only 7.3 mSv.
As Horizon II is shallower than Horizon I, there is a somewhat higher risk of
intrusion. However, this risk is still low, as discussed in Section 4.2. Horizon III
appears to overlie Horizon II in the area where the 239Pu is expected to remain; if
that aquifer is a usable source of drinking water, there is no reason to believe that
water well exploration would continue below it. The long-term risk due to the LLW
in Horizon II therefore appears to be slight, as only 239Pu will remain in levels
above drinking-water standards after 300 years and the likelihood of intrusion is
low.
3. The presence of Horizon III, which acts as a buffer, is an important factor in
limiting the likelihood of an inadvertent intrusion into the contaminated deeper
horizons. Care should be exercised in decommissioning the site to prevent con-
tamination of this groundwater resource. In addition, monitoring of the waters
of Horizon III would provide an early indication of the potential for unaccept-
able doses due to an inadvertent intrusion. A more rigorous evaluation of the
potential for contamination of Horizon III would allow adequate plans to be
put in place to prevent contamination.
The analysis of the likelihood of exposure indicates that the presence of Hori-
zon III could be important in reducing the probability of intrusion of deeper aquifers
for groundwater use. This aquifer overlies the regions where the majority of the
long-lived radionuclides will be retained and therefore would be encountered by an
exploratory water well before the wastes were contacted. If this aquifer is a usable
source of drinking water, there is little reason to expect continued exploration below
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it. The aquifer lies at much shallower depths and is thus within the reach of con-
ventional water-well technology for a domestic well. Horizon III is thus a highly
valuable buffer against inadvertent intrusion into the deeper disposal horizons. If it
can be shown that this is a usable water supply, then the chances of intrusion into
the deep aquifers are greatly reduced.
However, the attractiveness of Horizon III as an underground source of drink-
ing water also implies that it is important to protect it from contamination. It is
difficult to assess the potential for pollution of Horizon III. However, in the worst
case, a failure in the sealing or casing of a well penetrating Horizon III and in
communication with the deeper horizons could represent a viable pathway for con-
taminant migration. If the head gradient and degree of failure of the casing are such
that contaminated groundwater flows up into Horizon III, a significant possibility
of exposure may result.
4. The plume of long-lived transuranic radionuclides formed by HLW and ILW
injection is likely to persist for thousands of years, retaining roughly the same
geometry and migrating very slowly. Therefore, the maximum dose in the future
is proportional to the maximum concentration formed in the present. Detailed
modeling of the formation of the transuranic plume and subsurface monitoring
for long-lived constituents will therefore allow a much improved assessment of
the consequences of intrusion in the future.
In these analyses, the exposure path selected for analysis is the placement of a
drinking-water well in the contaminated plume and the subsequent use of the con-
taminated groundwater as the sole source of drinking water. Agricultural pathways
(irrigation and livestock watering) were not taken into account in estimating doses.
The analysis conducted here used the conservative estimate that the subsurface
concentration of long-lived radionuclides was equal to the concentration of these
radionuclides in the injected waste. However, the wastes may be dispersed as they
are injected, and waste interaction with the repository rock will alter the aqueous
phase concentrations. Over the long term, changes in the geochemical conditions
in the subsurface as the chemical conditions reach long-term equilibrium have the
potential to reduce maximum aqueous phase concentrations in the aquifer to below
those in the injected wastes. An analysis of the formation of the plume focused
on the hydrology and geochemistry of the disposal area itself will provide a much
more accurate estimate. Such an effort could be validated with field measurements
from wells in or near the disposal site, yielding a high degree of confidence in the
results. In addition, investigation of potential long-term changes in the subsurface
chemistry may provide insight into the changes in doses to a hypothetical intruder
after institutional controls fail.
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6.2 Fault Zone Failure Scenario
1. The barrier efficiency of the fault zone appears well substantiated in the area of
injection operations. The evidence for the confining ability of the fault zone far-
ther to the north is unclear. However, even if the barrier efficiency is impaired
several kilometers to the north of the fault zone, the radiological consequences
of discharge to the Yenisei River are minor. The maximum annual doses due to
ingestion of drinking water contaminated by discharge of wastes to the Yenisei
River are expected to be several orders of magnitude below the current 1 mSv
dose limit (specified in NRB-96, 1996) for at least the next 10,000 years.
There is substantial evidence for the confining ability of the fault zone in the
area of the disposal site, as discussed above. This includes the difference in static
water levels across the fault zone, the degree of vertical displacement, and the ex-
perience of injection operations in which changes in heads across the fault zone are
not observed in the region of waste disposal. However, several pieces of evidence
point to a gradual degradation in the confining ability of the fault zone farther to the
north. These include the water heads in northern wells located near the fault zone,
as well as geological maps showing a lower magnitude of vertical displacement.
However, even a failure of the fault zone in this region would not result in doses
above the 1 mSv annual dose limit. A large failure would cause contamination to
arrive in the Yenisei several thousand years sooner than in the base case scenario,
as seen by a comparison of Figures 4.3 and 5.15. The high discharge in the Yeni-
sei River will result in doses far lower than the current 1 mSv annual dose limit.
This dose is due only to the nonsorbed contaminant 99Tc. Long-lived transuranic
radionuclides will be retained in the downthrown block for over 10,000 years.
2. Failure of the fault zone will not lead to a significant change in the potential
maximum intrusion doses received in the future, although it will affect the lo-
cation and time that such doses might be received.
A comparison of the dose plots in Figure 5.15 with those in Figure 4.3 shows
that the western wastes will migrate faster in the event of a failure of the fault
zone and will reach the Yenisei River several thousand years sooner. However,
the maximum intrusion doses are not affected. Furthermore, a failure of the fault
zone as modeled does not significantly affect wastes discharged near the eastern
boundary of the disposal area, as can be seen in the dose plots. Only a small portion
of the wastes injected in the eastern wells will be drawn through the failed area of
the fault zone.
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6.3 Summary
Density-driven flow dominates regional groundwater flow patterns for dense waste
as in Horizon I. Therefore, modeling of the migration of dense wastes is not highly
sensitive to uncertainties in the porosity or the transmissivity of the aquifer. The
dense saline wastes are expected to settle in the depression north of the disposal
area. However, the time required for leakage through the confining layer between
Horizon I and Horizon II is sensitive to changes in the measured values of trans-
missivity. Travel time may be as short as 1,000 years if the measured transmissivity
values are lower than the actual values by a factor of two. This result underscores
the need for a better understanding of the potential hydraulic interaction between
the two aquifers in the northeastern section of the disposal area.
None of the hypothetical scenarios investigated poses a substantial risk to the
public in the short term. The long-term situation is less clear. Use of Horizon I
waters for drinking water could have severe consequences for the foreseeable fu-
ture (over 10,000 years), with annual doses well over 1 Sv possible. More refined
estimates of maximum potential drinking-water doses would require a better un-
derstanding of the dynamics of plume formation as a result of injection and the
geochemical changes that will occur as the aquifers reach a new geochemical equi-
librium. However, the likelihood is judged to be slight because of the depth to the
groundwater and the presence of more attractive groundwater resources in the river
valleys.
The mobility of 99Tc may result in subsurface concentrations in Horizon I near
potential discharge areas well above current regulatory limits. However, the 99Tc
would have to migrate vertically to reach areas where a well may be located. A
better understanding of the dynamics of discharge from the horizons to overlying
aquifers may clarify the significance of 99Tc.
A fault zone failure would not increase the risks posed by the site. Although
contamination of the Yenisei River could occur under this scenario, doses resulting
from the use of contaminated water from the Yenisei River are more than six orders
of magnitude below the currently acceptable 1 mSv annual dose limit specified in
NRB-96 (1996). This is primarily due to the enormous dilution potential of the
Yenisei River as compared with the Bolshoi Tel River.
Based on the analyses presented here, the deep well injection site at the MCC
does not appear to present a major short-term risk of public exposure or of signif-
icant contamination of the surface waters given the current understanding of en-
vironmental conditions. This is due primarily to the low groundwater velocities,
the degree of sorption that may reasonably be expected at the site, and the poten-
tial dilution of contaminated groundwater with surface water. The most significant
long-term risk appears to be the potential for use of contaminated groundwater for
drinking water after the loss of institutional control of the site.
Appendix I
Appendix I is not included in the printed version of this report because of space
constraints. Interested readers may consult either Chapter 2 of Volume I of this
report (Compton, K.L., Novikov, V., and Parker, F.L., 2000, Deep Well Injec-
tion of Liquid Radioactive Waste at Krasnoyarsk-26: Volume I, RR-00-01, In-
ternational Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria), or the
electronic version of this report, available online at the RAD Project home page:
www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/RAD.
Copies are also available from IIASA’s Publications Department.
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